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ABSTRACT
Special districts have been seen as a formalized institution for promoting regional cooperation.
They allow boundary design to the scale of public problems and may produce greater efficiency
in the marketplace for local public goods. Many scholars also have highlighted the flexibility of
special district boundaries once established, arguing that this flexibility allows for governance
that is more adaptable to changing resource constraints and patterns of demand. While flexible
boundaries might promote special districts’ ability to internalize spillovers while acting alone, it
might impede more ad hoc forms of cooperation among localities. This paper presents evidence
that boundary change is a substitute strategy to the establishment of intergovernmental
agreements for the resolution of interlocal policy challenges. By allowing special districts with
slack resources to expand into new territory, state rules that promote boundary flexibility reduce
the likelihood that districts will develop contracting relationships to share their surplus capacity
with neighboring governments. The results demonstrate the importance of considering the entire
package of coordinating institutions that are available in a given region when we examine how
local governments develop solutions to collective action problems.

Paper prepared for the Workshop on Networks and Coordination of Fragmented Authority: The
Challenge of Institutional Collective Action in Metropolitan Areas, Florida State University,
February 16-17, 2007. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance from Yphtach
Lelkes and Josh Weikert.

Do Special Districts Act Alone?: Exploring the Relationship
Between Flexible Boundaries and Intergovernmental Cooperation
Local infrastructure development gives rise to important collective action dilemmas:
scale economies that may not coincide with the scale of existing local governments, and negative
effects from promoting growth that spill over into neighboring jurisdictions. These dilemmas are
amplified in the case of infrastructure for the provision and treatment of drinking water.
Securing water supply to meet a community’s demands involves competing for access to an
increasingly scarce common pool resource. Once supply has been secured, the provision of
drinking water is capital intensive, with high fixed costs for the construction of storage,
treatment, and distribution facilities. These assets are highly specific and cannot be deployed for
other local government functions. Thus local governments can impose substantial costs on their
neighbors when making decisions regarding water infrastructure expansion. They also can help
their neighbors to achieve growth goals or resolve water scarcity issues by cooperating for
drinking water provision.
This paper focuses on the role of special districts in resolving local coordination
problems. Special districts often have been seen as a formalized institution for promoting
regional cooperation. They allow boundary design to the scale of public problems and may
produce greater efficiency in the marketplace for local public goods. Many scholars also have
highlighted the flexibility of special district boundaries once established, arguing that this
flexibility allows for governance that is more adaptable to changing resource constraints and
patterns of demand.
While special districts may be more adaptable in design, they also contribute to
fragmentation of local authority and the concomitant challenges of coordinating policy action
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across multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, it is possible that the flexibility of special district
boundaries might impede more ad hoc forms of cooperation among localities. This paper
considers whether the possibility of boundary change is a complement or substitute to the
establishment of interlocal policy agreements. In many circumstances, individual contracting
will be a more efficient solution to a collective action dilemma than adjustment of a
jurisdiction’s boundaries; contracting can maximize use of existing infrastructure while avoiding
negative externalities that might arise from boundary change. By allowing special districts to
bypass negotiating with their neighbors, boundary flexibility may reduce the incidence of
cooperative agreements that could help achieve policy efficiencies. Alternatively, it might
promote cooperation by allowing more creative solutions to regional conflict.
The following section discusses in greater detail how special district boundary flexibility
and intergovernmental contracts each help to resolve interlocal collective action problems. I then
offer hypotheses about how boundary flexibility might serve to promote or suppress the
development of ad hoc contracting relationships between local governments. The empirical
analysis focuses on local water policy to test these hypotheses, along with other explanations for
intergovernmental cooperation on the part of special districts. The analysis shows that for
special districts with surplus capacity for production or provision of drinking water, the
possibility of boundary change that would allow expansion of the district’s customer base
reduces the likelihood that the district will establish contracting relationships to share its surplus
capacity with neighboring governments. The results demonstrate the importance of considering
the entire package of coordinating institutions that are available in a given region when we
examine how local governments develop solutions to collective action problems.
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BOUNDARY FLEXIBILITY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Autonomous local governments with much of the power and stability of cities and
counties, special districts diversify local public economies by providing goods and services that
other local governments cannot or will not take on. They may supplement the efforts of general
purpose local governments in meeting demand for local services, or they replace the city or
county in providing an essential local function. Special district boundaries frequently crosscut
the boundaries of other local governments, creating layers of local authority that vary in their
geographic and functional breadth.
Many scholars and local government observers have expressed optimism about the
potential for special districts to help overcome interlocal collective action problems and improve
efficiency in the delivery of local services. Specialization allows the scope of each governmental
unit to be designed appropriately for the policy area it oversees, allowing economies of scale to
be captured and the consequences of policy actions to be internalized (Hawkins 1976; Ostrom,
Bish, and Ostrom 1988; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Advocates of regional governance
as a means to improve policy coordination view functionally specialized metropolitan bodies as a
politically palatable first step toward a broader regionalism (Altshuler et al. 1999; Downs 1994;
Pagano 1999).
While many of the perceived benefits of special district governance stem from policy
specialization, some analysts suggest that it is the flexibility of special district boundaries that
helps reduce spillover effects and heighten responsiveness to changing public preferences.
Foster (1997: 97-98) describes special districts as “geographically adaptable,” able to adjust their
boundaries in order to accommodate new development or changes in technology or demand.
This is in contrast with “geographically rigid” general purpose governments with jurisdictions
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that do not overlap. Hooghe and Marks (2003) treat special districts as a form of Type II
governance, characterized in part by flexible design that allows fluidity in jurisdictional size.
These treatments suggest that special districts produce efficiencies not only at the formation
stage, when their geographic territory can be designed to capture economies of scale and
minimize negative externalities, but throughout their lifespan, as their boundaries get adjusted to
address new spillovers or accommodate changing populations or preferences.
Empirical evidence on special district boundary changes is scant. The literature on city
boundary changes has identified cost savings in service provision as one motivation for
municipal efforts to annex neighboring unincorporated territory, along with other rationale
including expansion of the tax base and local preferences to change the racial balance of the city
(Austin 1999; Feiock and Carr 1991; Liner 1990; Liner and McGregor 1996). Efficiency and
service considerations are likely to predominate in the case of special district boundary changes.
Special district boundaries do not shape perceptions of local political community as city
boundaries do, and special districts lack the land use authority that would allow them to practice
exclusionary politics (Danielson 1972). Moreover, it is uncommon for special districts to
manage redistributive functions that create the strongest justification for a large tax base. Some
special districts do have the authority to impose property taxes, thus creating an incentive to
widen their jurisdiction. But in general, expansion of special district boundaries is likely a
response to changing service demands or opportunities to achieve policy efficiencies.
Boundary changes can help to solve a local policy dilemma by shaping a single
jurisdiction to the scale of the problem or the service demand. Another strategy is the
development of cooperative agreements between two or more governments. These
intergovernmental agreements may consist of contracts for the purchase of goods or services by
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one government from another, or agreements for a government to provide a good or service
outside its jurisdictional boundaries. Cooperative agreements between localities are a form of
institutional collective action (Post 2004), and they can help reduce damage from spillovers and
otherwise overcome the negative impacts of fragmented governance. They also can increase
efficiency by taking advantage of slack in existing infrastructure and capturing economies of
scale. Pursuit of cost savings is a dominant reason for contracting by local governments
(Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Stein 1990). In many cases, intergovernmental cooperation will
produce more efficient policy solutions than boundary change. Contracts are more adaptable
than even the most flexible jurisdictional boundaries, and they can allow separation of the
production and the provision of public goods and the development of competitive markets for
each (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Even boundary review commissions, state and
county institutions established to guide local government creation and boundary change, over
time have begun to promote intergovernmental agreements as an efficient and less controversial
alternative to annexation (ACIR 1992: 33).

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COORDINATING MECHANISMS
Boundary change and intergovernmental agreements are two mechanisms by which
special districts might address institutional collective action problems. The model presented here
examines whether a relationship exists between these mechanisms. In the case of cities, pursuit
of efficiency gains has been shown to be a primary motivation for municipal annexation and the
establishment of interlocal agreements. Cities rarely have the opportunity to choose between
these tools, however, since city boundaries cannot overlap. Annexation therefore requires some
supply of annexable land. Indeed, Stein’s (1990) thorough analysis of municipal service
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arrangements showed no consistent relationship between a city’s annexation authority and its
decision to contract for services. Special district boundaries have been perceived as more
flexible and able to adapt to changing problem conditions and public demands. There is reason
to question the flexibility of special district boundaries in practice—just like cities, some special
districts are restricted by their enabling legislation from overlapping districts of the same type,
and a few analysts have expressed concern that special districts can be difficult to terminate once
demand for their services has disappeared (ACIR 1964; Little Hoover Commission 2000). But if
it is indeed more feasible for special districts to change their boundaries, does this affect their
incentives for developing interlocal agreements with other governments?
A relationship between institutional mechanisms might operate in either direction. The
stronger hypothesis is that boundary flexibility and intergovernmental agreements are substitute
strategies. If boundary flexibility increases the opportunity for a special district to expand its
jurisdiction, that could reduce the district’s incentives to cooperate with neighboring
governments. This would apply especially to districts with slack resources. A district with
excess capacity in its infrastructure might prefer to provide services to new customers on its own
rather than form an agreement to sell that capacity to a nearby jurisdiction. Special districts
could seek to internalize spillovers through expansion rather than negotiate an agreement with
neighboring communities that suffer costs from the district’s operations. With less boundary
flexibility, interlocal cooperation may seem a more attractive strategy. Alternatively, boundary
flexibility and intergovernmental cooperation might complement one another by increasing the
range of possible solutions to policy dilemmas created by local fragmentation. Post (2002) has
shown that a larger supply of potential partners increases the incidence of interlocal agreements.
Boundary flexibility does not increase the density of governments in a region, but it does allow
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territorial change by those governments that may cause them to become more likely partners for
an agreement—for example, by creating overlap or a common boundary that facilitates labor
sharing or infrastructure extension.
Provision of services by a special district typically has been treated as an alternative to
municipal annexation (Carr 2004; Feiock and Carr 2001) or to intergovernmental agreements
(LeRoux and Carr 2006). The analysis presented here shifts the focus to the adaptability of
special districts after they have been established. Special district formation may be intended to
close service gaps or increase efficiency in service delivery, but once created special districts
contribute to the fragmentation of authority that can give rise to policy conflicts and collective
action problems. Specialized governments are able to employ the same strategies that cities use
to address these challenges—they can change boundaries and develop cooperative agreements
with their neighbors. Whether expansion or an interlocal agreement is the better solution will
depend on the nature and extent of the policy dilemma. This analysis examines whether the
availability of boundary change as an alternative strategy affects the decisions that special
districts make about entering into interlocal agreements.

Empirical Analysis of Local Water Policy
The empirical analysis tests the relationship between boundary flexibility and interlocal
cooperation in the domain of local water policy. The provision of drinking water is one of the
most important services that American local governments oversee, and the nature of the good
makes it particularly vulnerable to coordination problems and policy inefficiencies.1 The typical
policy challenge begins with new demand for water service. This new demand might result from
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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that 57 percent of community water systems are privately
owned, but they serve only 14 percent of the population (U.S. EPA 1997, 7-8).
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residential or commercial development in a growing community, but it also arises in aging
communities where declining productivity of individual wells brings about demand for
connection to a community water system. Whether or not the new demand is located within the
existing service area of a public water utility, delivering drinking water to satisfy the increased
demand may pose a difficult policy challenge. A utility with a monopoly on service to the
territory may need to acquire new supply in order to avoid jeopardizing water service to its
existing customers.2 As common pool resources, groundwater aquifers and clean rivers are
vulnerable to overexploitation; utilities have more incentive to secure a plentiful water supply for
their own customers than to protect the source for other communities or for ecosystem health.
Moreover, the capital-intensive nature of water storage and treatment facilities create scale
economies that can make it particularly costly for small utilities to expand service.
Intergovernmental coordination is even more difficult if the new demand falls outside the
existing service area of any utility. On top of the supply questions described above, local
governments must coordinate in order to ensure water provision to the new territory without
duplicating effort. Frequently the policy solution in these situations is for a nearby utility to
expand its service area to include the territory where the new demand is located. If a city or
county operates the utility, this typically involves extending the utility’s service area outside the
jurisdiction of the responsible government. Many states permit extralocal service provision,
especially by utilities. A city’s decision to annex new territory typically would involve more
considerations than water service alone. For water districts, extending service would more likely
entail a boundary change. Changing the district’s boundaries includes residents of the new
territory as constituents of the district, subject to fees and taxes imposed by the district and able
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Approval of new development by general purpose governments without assurance of adequate water supply is
itself an important coordination problem. See Hanak (2005) for a discussion of this issue in the California context.
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to vote for district officials and bond measures. Since special district boundary change does not
affect citizens’ definitions of their local political community, it is not likely to encounter any
more resistance than would be the case for a simple extension of service. Indeed, existing
residents of the water district might insist on boundary change in order to extend the district’s
revenue base.
An alternative solution to this policy challenge would be the establishment of interlocal
cooperative agreements. Cooperative agreements allow separation of responsibility for water
supply and water service. The utility with the most proximate water mains usually will be the
most cost-effective service provider, but in some cases it will not have sufficient water supply for
new customers. Neighboring utilities may have slack resources for water production after
building in excess capacity in anticipation of future demand.3 In other cases, the best solution
might involve utilizing infrastructure owned by multiple utilities. Boundary change creates a
permanent commitment for a utility to serve the new territory, while interlocal agreements
promote ad hoc policy solutions that may supplement or replace that commitment.

Data
The analysis estimates the effect of water district boundary flexibility on incidence of
intergovernmental agreements. Observations are individual water districts. Data on
intergovernmental agreements come from the finance phase of the 2002 Census of Governments.
The models estimate effects for two different dependent variables: local intergovernmental
expenditures and local intergovernmental revenues. Both are coded as dichotomous variables;
an intergovernmental agreement is seen to exist when a water district reports any local

3

Seasonal variation in demand for water is another important source of slack resources. In climates susceptible to
drought, seasonal variation also is an important source of uncertainty about water demand.
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intergovernmental spending or revenue.4 Across all functions, special districts are less likely
than their general-purpose counterparts to establish intergovernmental agreements: 32 percent of
special districts report some local intergovernmental spending or revenue, compared to 54
percent of cities and towns. As Stein (1990) has shown, the nature of a good can influence the
likelihood of alternative service provision. Interlocal cooperation is rarer for water, with only 12
percent of water districts participating in interlocal agreements related to water.
The key independent variable, boundary flexibility, refers to the stringency of state rules
guiding the process of special district boundary change. When crafting legislation that enables
formation of new special districts, states define the process for boundary expansion and change.
These rules then become part of the package of constraints and opportunities that district officials
face when considering strategies for addressing policy challenges related to water service.
Previous research has demonstrated the importance of state policy for stimulating special district
formation and reliance (Austin 1998; Bollens 1986; Burns 1994; Foster 1997; MacManus 1981;
McCabe 2000; but see Carr 2006), but we know little about the impact of state rules governing
special district boundaries on the organization and behavior of local governments.
Findings about the effect of state boundary change rules on city annexations have been
mixed (Carr and Feiock 2001; Dye 1964; Galloway and Landis 1986; Liner 1990; Liner and
McGregor 1996; MacManus and Thomas 1979). Data are not available for special district
boundary changes as they are for city annexations; thus we cannot measure the effect of rules on
district expansions. But for the current purpose, it is rules rather than actual boundary changes
that are of interest. Regardless of the frequency with which special districts alter their territorial
reach, it is the obstacles they face in doing so that define the flexibility of their boundaries. State
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Included in the analysis are independent special districts that report water supply as their primary function. The
dependent variable measures only intergovernmental agreements related to water functions.
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rules make it more or less difficult for special districts to absorb new territory.5 If a relationship
exists between boundary flexibility and intergovernmental cooperation, district officials will
consider the relative ease of both strategies in deciding what mechanisms to employ. Rules grant
or withhold voice for residents of the district and the new territory, and they set procedural
requirements for hearings and county review of a boundary change proposal. Restrictive rules
will make boundary change a less attractive option for district officials. If cooperation is a
complementary strategy, restrictive rules also should suppress interlocal agreements. If the
strategies are substitutes, agreements should replace boundary changes where rules are stringent.
The source for data on boundary change rules is state enabling legislation. Starting with
a sample of 21 states, I compiled a list of all water district types in each state using information
from the Individual State Descriptions volume of the 2002 Census of Governments (U.S. Census
Bureau 2005). I then consulted state statutes enabling each special district type to code
procedural rules for changing district boundaries subsequent to district establishment. The
procedural rules parallel requirements for municipal annexation identified and coded by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR): majority approval of the
boundary change by residents of the district, majority approval by residents and/or landowners of
the territory to be added to the district, organization of a public hearing, and approval of a county
governing authority (ACIR 1992).6 These rules are combined into an index scored 1-4
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The recent contribution to this literature by Carr and Feiock (2001) reported the surprising finding that more
restrictive annexation rules actually increase the frequency of municipal annexation. In estimating the relationship
between rules and actual annexations, this and other studies in effect are measuring the degree to which annexation
opponents are able to exploit those rules. Indeed, Carr and Feiock suggest that their result may be attributable to
annexation supporters pursuing smaller proposals that encounter less resistance. Because special district boundary
changes do not directly affect residents’ perceptions of their political community, they are not as likely to spark
controversy and attract opposition. Therefore I assume that a larger number of procedural hurdles serves as a
disincentive for district officials to pursue boundary change.
6
In some cases, referendum or majority approval is required only upon request. Since local actors always must
consider the possibility that someone will request the referendum, these cases are coded as requiring majority
approval.
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measuring the stringency of rules for special district boundary change. In addition, I measured
whether a requirement exists for new territory to be contiguous with a special district’s existing
jurisdiction: the rule is scored 1 if there is a contiguity requirement, and 0 if not. After coding
boundary change rules, I assigned values to individual water districts. Some states have common
boundary change rules that apply to all special districts. In other states, I scored each district’s
type using information contained in district names and state and individual district Web sites.
The analysis omits districts formed under specific enabling legislation and districts with
boundaries that must be contiguous with a city or county. These omissions removed four states
from the sample, producing a dataset containing 1,383 water districts in 17 states.
Careful examination of procedural requirements for special district boundary change
reveals that districts are not as adaptable as some analysts have suggested. Once a special
district has been established, district officials and other local actors may face important hurdles
to expanding the district’s jurisdiction. Table 1 shows boundary change rules for the states
included in this analysis. The first column indicates the state’s score on the four-point index for
municipal annexation rules, using data collected by the ACIR. The second column includes the
parallel score for water district boundary change rules, averaged across water districts in the
state.7 The number of procedural requirements ranges from one in Alabama to all four in
California, demonstrating the special district boundaries are not equally flexible in all contexts.
Moreover, in the majority of states, procedures for water district boundary change are more
restrictive than procedures for municipal annexation. Expectations for contiguity are relatively
rare among special districts, however. These appear in the table’s final column. The majority of
water districts in 11 of the 17 states may add territory that is not adjacent to the current district.

7

If the boundary change rules vary across district type in the state, more common district types receive more weight
in the state index score shown in Table 1.
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[TABLE 1 HERE]
Measuring boundary flexibility by the number of rules restricting boundary change, a
more flexible special district is one with a lower score on the boundary rules index. If boundary
flexibility is a substitute to intergovernmental cooperation, then, we should expect a positive
relationship between boundary rules and incidence of an interlocal agreement. A negative effect
would suggest a complementary relationship in which restrictions on boundary change reduce
agreements by suppressing opportunities for creative interlocal collaboration.

Control Variables
Other variables in the model control for fiscal, intergovernmental, institutional, and
problem severity conditions that also could affect the likelihood of water districts engaging in
interlocal cooperation. Missing from the model are demographic characteristics of special
districts that might influence local demand for cooperative agreements. Very few states make
available geographic data on special district boundaries that would allow calculation of the size,
wealth, or homogeneity of a district’s population. Consequently, the analysis focuses on
economic factors, the supply of potential cooperative partners, district governing structure, and
the local policy context. Except where noted otherwise, the data source is the 2002 Census of
Governments.

Fiscal Variables: Fiscal variables measure the capacity of a special district to fund its own water
supply functions and offer production resources to its neighbors, as well as the tax burden on
area residents. Larger districts should have more opportunity to build and operate their own
water storage and treatment facilities. Current expenditures is an indicator of district size; it
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measures general expenditures for current water operations. Debt finance is a dichotomous
variable indicating whether the water district reported to the Census of Governments that its
operations include financing public facilities or services by issuing public debt. A positive
response suggests that the district perceives the construction of capital facilities as one of its
primary functions, suggesting that it may have extra capacity to share with neighboring
jurisdictions. Long-term debt is another indicator of capacity, measuring the actual level of
outstanding long-term debt held by the district. I expect all three of these fiscal capacity
variables to have a positive effect on incidence of revenue-generating intergovernmental
agreements and a negative effect on agreements involving interlocal expenditures. In addition, I
include a variable for Property taxes per capita imposed by the state and all local governments
located within the district’s home county. A heavy tax burden on the local population will make
boundary change less attractive to special districts, and they may be more likely to cooperate
rather than build and operate their own expensive facilities.

Intergovernmental Variables: Post (2002) has shown that interlocal cooperation is more likely to
occur where local governments have access to a larger number of potential partners. County
local governments measures the number of local governments located within the special district’s
home county. Multicounty districts reach across county lines and therefore should be more likely
to find opportunities for collaboration. Districts with Common boundaries have boundaries that
correspond to a single city or county, possibly encouraging a long-term cooperative relationship
between these governments with a shared jurisdiction. The degree to which a special district
focuses on a single function also might influence its opportunities for collaboration. Proportion
spending on water indicates the proportion of the district’s total current general expenditures that
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are dedicated to water. Finally, I included two variables to control for the use of other possible
coordinating mechanisms in the face of interlocal policy challenges. City annexation rules is a
four-point index measuring the stringency of procedural requirements for municipal annexation,
compiled by the ACIR (ACIR 1992). As with special districts, municipal boundary change may
be a complement or a substitute to intergovernmental cooperation. This variable captures the
impact of city boundary flexibility. Local actors also might choose to address service gaps or
policy inefficiencies by creating a new special district. District formations is the change in the
number of special districts located in the county between 1992 and 2002, per 10,000 county
residents.

Institutional Variable: Drawing on analyses demonstrating the importance of local government
structure as a factor influencing interlocal cooperation (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991) and other
local policies (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001), the model includes a variable measuring the
proportion of the special district’s governing board that is elected rather than appointed to office.
Data for Proportion elected come from the 1992 Census of Governments, the last time the
Census collected data on popularly elected officials. Elected boards should have a stronger
incentive to seek out policy efficiencies in order to lower the tax and fee burden on district
constituents. However, appointed boards could have a broader geographic scope and may even
include representatives from other local governments that could be potential partners.

Problem Severity Variables: The final set of control variables addresses the seriousness of local
water policy problems. Lubell et al. (2002) have shown that cooperation is more likely to
emerge where objective conditions related to a public problem are more severe. For this
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analysis, communities are most likely to confront water supply challenges where the local
climate is hot and dry and where population growth has strained existing infrastructure and
supply sources. These conditions may give rise to the kind of collective action problems
described earlier and the need for a coordinated policy response. Climate variables come from
maps produced by the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) showing annual data on mean
total precipitation and mean daily maximum temperature, computed for the period 1961-1990.
The NCDC integrates point measurements collected at thousands of weather stations nationwide
with other spatial datasets to generate these climate maps. To assign values to the water districts,
I plotted each district as point data in the center of the district’s home county. Merging the point
data with the climate maps produced values for the utilities on Precipitation and daily maximum
Temperature, each variable scored as an index. Population growth indicates the percentage
change in population of the water district’s home county between 1990 and 2000. The model
also includes interactions between each problem severity variable and the four-point index of
boundary change rules. Problem severity can heighten the salience of a policy issue and increase
the costs for inaction, thereby affecting the incentives local officials face when they make policy
choices (Mullin 2005). Resource scarcity may serve to intensify interjurisdictional cooperation
or promote create cooperative policy solutions. As a result, it may influence the relationship
between boundary flexibility and intergovernmental coordination.

To estimate the effects of these variables on the likelihood that a water district engages in
interlocal cooperation, I use a probit model with observations clustered according to the state
laws that set rules for boundary change. In some cases, the cluster is defined by the statute
enabling the specific type of water district; in other cases, all of a state’s water districts belong to
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the same cluster because a single law governs boundary change for all district types. The dataset
includes 23 clusters of water districts in 17 states.
[TABLE 2 HERE]

Results
Results from the probit analysis appear in Table 2. The first column shows estimates for
the effect of each independent variable on a water district’s entry into an intergovernmental
agreement in which the district makes expenditures. In the second column, the dependent
variable is existence of revenue-generating interlocal cooperation. The table presents the
estimates as first differences, or differences in the predicted probability of engaging in an
intergovernmental agreement associated with a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of
each independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.8 The
model’s fit is better for explaining a water district’s decision to purchase supply or services from
another local government than for explaining the provision of water services, with the pseudo-r2
for each model at .15 and .09, respectively.
The distinction between expenditure and revenue contracts is an important one. Among
the sampled water districts, revenue contracts are somewhat more prevalent than expenditure
contracts: six percent of water districts participated in the former, and four percent the latter.
Only two utilities in the sample reported both expenditures and revenues from interlocal
cooperation, however, and the models reveal a number of differences in the determinants of the
two contract types.

8

Predicted probabilities are based on a probit model estimated using the Clarify routine in STATA (King et al.
2000; Tomz et al. 2001).
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The analysis reveals a positive relationship between the stringency of boundary change
rules and a special district’s likelihood of receiving interlocal revenue. Increasing the number of
procedural hurdles for district boundary change from one to four boosts the likelihood of a
district participating in a revenue-generating contract by 9 percentage points. This finding
supports the hypothesis that boundary flexibility and intergovernmental cooperation are
substitute strategies for addressing local coordination problems. When a water district has
surplus supply or other resources, it could put those resources to use by expanding its own
boundaries to enlarge its customer base, or it could establish a cooperative agreement that allows
other local governments to take advantage of the district’s excess capacity. Depending on the
nature of the specific policy problem, either of these strategies might be the more efficient and
durable policy solution. But the analysis suggests that the two are in fact alternative solutions—
where boundary change is a more feasible strategy, the incidence of interlocal cooperation
declines. The same does not hold true for special district spending on interlocal cooperation.
When a district requires supply or services, the flexibility of its boundaries and the boundaries of
surrounding districts does not appear to influence its choice to enter into a contract with another
local government. Requirements that additional territory be contiguous to a water district’s
existing jurisdiction do not affect districts’ decisions to enter into either type of agreement.
Among fiscal considerations, debt affects the incidence of both types of cooperation.
Districts that report debt financing as a primary function are more likely to cooperate by
providing services to other localities. Levels of debt do not matter for revenue contracts but they
do for expenditure agreements; high levels of outstanding debt increase the probability that a
water district will purchase supply or services from another local government. It may be that
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highly indebted districts cannot secure the capital needed to develop their own infrastructure due
to state-imposed debt limits or poor bond ratings.9
Intergovernmental variables have a larger impact on revenue than expenditure
agreements. The number of local governments in the county has no effect on cooperation for
drinking water, but multicounty districts and districts with boundaries that correspond to a city or
county are more likely to provide supply or services to another local government. Recent special
district formations in the county have a large negative effect on the likelihood of revenue
contracting, supporting the treatment of special district formation as another substitute to
contracting for the provision of local services. Special districts that dedicate more of their
attention to water are more likely to cooperate for both sales and purchases. It is possible that
specialization allows district officials to concentrate their attention on maximizing policy
efficiencies.
Election of special district officials has a small and weakly significant positive effect on
cooperation for districts requiring services, but no effect for districts that have slack resources to
share with other governments. Electoral incentives seem to have the most influence when
district officials are trying to avoid supply shortages; this analysis provides no evidence that they
make a difference for revenue-generating policy activities.
Finally, conditions that affect the severity of water supply issues in a community do not
have a clear and consistent relationship with cooperative behavior. None of the problem severity
variables has a significant impact on the probability of water districts to contract out their own
services through revenue-generating agreements. A hot climate and population growth both
demonstrate some influence on the likelihood of contracting to obtain services, but the estimates
9

The very large effect size reported in Table 2 for long-term debt on incidence of revenue agreements is attributable
to outlying observations. Calculating the first difference associated with a shift from the 10th to the 90th percentile
values of long-term debt produces an increase in probability of cooperation of less than .01.
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operate in opposite directions. Population growth has a sizeable positive effect on cooperation as
predicted, but water districts in hotter regions appear to be somewhat less likely to establish
interlocal agreements to cope with mismatch between water supply and patterns of demand.
Since this latter estimate is small and weakly significant, the analysis is not conclusive regarding
the effects of climate on interlocal coordination for water service.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Table 2 shows the first differences for problem severity variables with the number of
boundary rules set at its mean value of 2.8 rules. I also was interested in the interaction between
boundary rules and problem status—specifically, whether the relationship between boundary
flexibility and intergovernmental cooperation varies with the severity of objective conditions
related to water. Figure 1 shows first differences in the probability of cooperation across the
range of values for each measure of problem severity. Again, results vary for the different
elements of problem severity, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions from the analysis. For
revenue agreements, the temperature and population change interactions show that increased
demand resulting from hot climates and population growth serve to intensify the substitutability
of boundary flexibility and interlocal cooperation. This could be evidence of coordinated
regional resource planning where water is scarce. In areas that have experienced drought
conditions or rapid growth, water becomes an important consideration in land use planning.
Local land use officials should be more likely to plan for water service prior to approving new
development. Boundary change rules may determine whether the policy solution consists of
expanding a local water district or establishing intergovernmental supply and service contracts.
Where water resources are under less pressure, land use officials may be less likely to plan ahead
for water service, and boundary constraints may have less influence over policy decisions when

20

coordination challenges do arise. The result for precipitation runs in the opposite direction,
however. All else held constant, as severity of water as a policy problem declines with increased
rainfall, we also see boundary rules develop a stronger relationship of substitutability with
interlocal cooperation. For expenditure contracts, precipitation is the only element of problem
status that has a conditioning effect on the relationship among coordination strategies. Taken as
a whole, it is difficult to discern a consistent pattern to these findings, and the role of problem
severity in modifying the relationship between coordinating mechanisms will require further
development in future research.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The analysis presented here sheds light on the complex institutional environment within
which local actors select strategies for addressing policy challenges that cross jurisdictional lines.
Interlocal agreements are a flexible policy tool that can help local governments close service
gaps, overcome mismatch in the distribution of resources and resource demand, and improve
efficiency in service delivery. At the same time, the transaction costs for developing an
agreement may be high, and the possibility of renegotiation or exit heightens uncertainty for
governments entering into an agreement and creates challenges for long-term planning. This
paper has explored whether the attractiveness of intergovernmental policy coordination is
contingent on the ease with which local governments can act alone. The findings indicate that a
relationship does exist between solo and joint policy strategies. When a government has excess
capacity for public good production or service provision, it faces a choice between boundary
change to expand its jurisdiction and secure a permanent market for its goods, or the
establishment of interlocal agreements that allow neighboring governments to utilize that surplus

21

capacity. This analysis has shown that the procedural hurdles a government faces in changing its
boundaries affect its likelihood of cooperating with neighbors through formal contracts.
While boundary change and interlocal contracting appear to be substitute strategies for
water districts with excess capacity, it is important to note that districts pursuing boundary
change might still be engaging in an informal form of intergovernmental cooperation. Faced
with a policy challenge related to water supply, it may be the case that localities in a region reach
agreement that expanding the boundaries of an existing water district is the best mechanism for
internalizing spillovers or achieving efficiency gains. Acting alone does not necessarily mean
acting without consultation. The data analyzed here do not allow inferences about the process of
policy choice in these scenarios of fragmented authority.
To the extent that water districts are acting unilaterally, however, they may be
contributing to the development of further collective action problems down the road.
Nationwide, water supply is becoming a more important consideration in planning and zoning
for growth. Coordinated planning for water and land use is necessary to ensure adequate water
supply for all essential uses while protecting the environment and economic productivity.
Understanding boundary change as a substitute strategy to cooperative agreements has important
implications for the possibility that coordinated planning will emerge. Flexible boundaries may
create an incentive for water districts to preserve slack resources in order to expand into new
territory. This could drive land use policy, as city and county planners increasingly respond to
availability of water supply. The end result may be the creation of new spillover effects in other
policy areas, if growth gets misplaced due to water districts’ management of their surplus
capacity. If boundary flexibility creates a disincentive for interlocal cooperation, states that seek
to promote coordinated planning might consider locking in special district boundaries.
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Table 1. State Boundary Change Rules

Alabama
California
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia

Municipal
Annexation
Index (ACIR)
1
1
3
0
1
3
0
3
0
0
2
3
2
1
0
3
2

Water District
Boundary
Change Index
1
4
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
3
2

Water District
Contiguity
Requirement
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
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Table 2. Establishment of Interlocal Agreements on Water: First Differences

Boundary change rule index
Contiguity requirement
Fiscal Variables:
Current expenditures
Debt finance
Long-term debt
Property taxes per capita
Intergovernmental Variables:
County local governments
Multicounty
Common boundaries
Proportion spending on water
City annexation rules
District formations
Institutional Variable:
Proportion elected
Problem Severity Variables:
Precipitation
Temperature
Population growth
N
Pseudo R2

Revenue
Agreements
.09 ***
-.03

.18
.05 ***
.74
.11
.01
.02 *
.04 ***
.04 **
-.01
-.25 ***

Expenditure
Agreements
-.07
-.01

.02
.01
.98 ***
.08
-.00
.01
-.01
.02 **
.02
.09

-.04

.02 *

.02
.01
-.05
1393
.09

.00
-.03 *
.08 **
1393
.15

Cells show the difference in predicted probability of intergovernmental cooperation
associated with a shift from the minimum to maximum value of each independent variable,
holding all other variables constant at their mean values. First differences are based on
probit models with observations are clustered by special district types sharing the same
boundary rules. Estimates are significant at * p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10.
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Figure 1. Problem Status and the Relationship between Boundary Rules and Cooperation
Expenditure Agreements:

Revenue Agreements:
Effect of Boundary Rules on IG Revenue by Temperature

Effect of Boundary Rules on IG Expenditure by Temperature
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics
Variable
Dependent Variables:
Revenue agreements
Expenditure agreements
Water District Boundary Rules:
Boundary change rule index
Contiguity requirement
Fiscal Variables:
Current expenditures ($1 million)
Debt finance
Long-term debt ($1 million)
Property taxes per capita ($1000)
Intergovernmental Variables:
County local governments
Multicounty
Common boundaries
Proportion spending on water
City annexation rules
District formations (per 10,000 people)
Institutional Variable:
Proportion elected
Problem Severity Variables:
Precipitation
Temperature
Population growth

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

.06
.04

.24
.21

0
0

1
1

2.78
.47

.84
.50

1
0

4
1

2.43
.26
9.78
.79

20.49
.44
101.55
.44

0
0
0
0

673.87
1
3512.77
5.09

57.78
.23
.12
.91
1.64
.34

73.75
.42
.33
.21
1.01
1.36

2
0
0
0
0
-6.86

462
1
1
1
3
14.49

.74

.44

0

1

4.98
5.08
.16

1.77
1.46
.18

1
2
-.23

9
9
1.85
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Appendix B. Establishment of Interlocal Agreements on Water: Probit Coefficients

Boundary change rule index
Contiguity requirement
Fiscal Variables:
Current expenditures
Debt finance
Long-term debt
Property taxes per capita
Intergovernmental Variables:
County local governments
Multicounty
Common boundaries
Proportion spending on water
City annexation rules
District formations
Institutional Variable:
Proportion elected
Problem Severity Variables:
Precipitation
Temperature
Population growth
Interactions:
Precipitation * Boundary rules
Temperature * Boundary rules
Population growth * Boundary rules
N
Pseudo R2
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood

Revenue
Agreements
-.42
-.32

Expenditure
Agreements
-1.10 **
-.22

.00
.38 ***
.00
.07

-.07
.16
.01 ***
.13

.00
.20 *
.31 ***
.55 **
-.02
-.13 ***

-.00
.22
-.21
.89 **
.14
.04

-.34

.43 *

-.19
-.10
-3.54 *

-.46 ***
-.02
-.94

.07 *
.04
1.10 *
1393
.09
2668.49
-297.61

.47 ***
-.02
.17 **
1393
.15
5594.89
-216.52

Cells show coefficients and standard errors from a probit estimation with observations clustered by special
district types sharing the same boundary rules. Estimates are significant at * p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10.
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